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The Persistance of Memory: Surreal Trajectories in
Bohm’s Theory Jeffrey A. Barrett
Abstract
In this paper I describe the history of the surreal trajectories prob-
lem and argue that in fact it is not a problem for Bohm’s theory. More
specifically, I argue that one can take the particle trajectories predicted
by Bohm’s theory to be the actual trajectories that particles follow
and that there is no reason to suppose that good particle detectors
are somehow fooled in the context of the surreal trajectories experi-
ments. Rather than showing that Bohm’s theory predicts the wrong
particle trajectories or that it somehow prevents one from making re-
liable measurements, such experiments ultimately reveal the special
role played by position and the fundamental incompatibility between
Bohm’s theory and the relativity.1
1This paper is an extension of the discussion of surreal trajectories in Barrett (1999,
127–40). That section of the book was based on talk I gave at the Quantum Mechanics
Workshop at the University of Pittsburgh in the Spring of 1997. And that talk owed much
to conversations with Peter Lewis, David Albert, and Rob Clifton.
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1Bohm’s theory2 has become increasingly popular as a nonrelativistic solution
to the quantum measurement problem. It makes the same empirical predic-
tions for the statistical distribution of particle configurations as the standard
von Neumann-Dirac collapse formulation of quantum mechanics whenever
the latter makes unambiguous predictions. Bohm’s theory also treats mea-
suring devices exactly the same way it treats other physical systems. The
quantum-mechanical state of a system always evolves in the usual linear, de-
terministic way, so one does not encounter the problems that arise in collapse
formulations of quantum mechanics when one tries to stipulate the conditions
under which a collapse occurs. And Bohm’s theory does not require one to
postulate branching worlds or disembodied minds or any of the other extrava-
gant assumptions that often accompany no-collapse formulations of quantum
mechanics.
While Bohm’s theory avoids many of the problems associated with other
formulations of quantum mechanics, it does have its own problems. One
problem, it has been argued, is that the particle trajectories it predicts are
not the real particle trajectories. This is the surreal trajectories problem. If
Bohm’s theory does in fact make false predictions concerning particle trajec-
tories, then this is presumably a serious problem. I will argue, however, that
there is no reason to suppose that Bohm’s theory makes false predictions con-
cerning the trajectories of particles. Indeed, I will argue that a good position
measuring device need never be mistaken concerning the actual position of
a particle at the moment that the particle’s position is in fact recorded.
While surreal trajectories are not a problem for Bohm’s theory, the way
that it accounts for the results of the surreal trajectories experiments reveals
2This is the theory described by David Bohm in 1952. Bohm’s most complete descrip-
tion of his theory is found in Bohm and Hiley (1993).
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the sense in which it is fundamentally incompatible with relativity, and this
is a problem.
2
On Bohm’s theory the quantum-mechanical state ψ evolves in the usual
linear, deterministic way, but one supposes that every particle always has a
determinate position and follows a continuous, determinsitic trajectory. The
motion of a particular particle typically depends on the evolution of ψ and
the positions of other (perhaps distant) particles. The particle motion is
described by an auxiliary dynamics, a dynamics that supplements the usual
linear quantum dynamics. In its simplest form, what one might call the
minimal version (the version of the theory described by Bell 1987, 127),
Bohm’s theory is characterized by the following basic principles:
1. State Description: The complete physical state at a time is given by
the wave function ψ and the determinate particle configuration Q.
2. Wave Dynamics: The time evolution of the wave function is given by
the usual linear dynamics. In the simplest case, this is just Schro¨dinger’s
equation
ih¯
∂ψ
∂t
= Hˆψ (1)
More generally, one uses the form of the linear dynamics appropriate to one’s
application (as in the spin examples discussed below).
3. Particle Dynamics: The particles move according to
dQk
dt
=
1
mk
Im(ψ∗∇kψ)
ψ∗ψ
evaluated at Q (2)
where mk is the mass of particle k and Q is the current particle configuration.
4. Distribution Postulate: There is a time t0 when the epistemic proba-
bility density for the configuration Q is given by ρ(Q, t0) = |ψ(Q, t0)|2.
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If there are N particles, then ψ is a function in 3N -dimensional config-
uration space (three dimensions for the position of each particle), and the
current particle configuration Q is represented by a single point in configu-
ration space (in configuration space a single point gives the position of every
particle). Again, each particle moves in a way that depends on its position,
the evolution of the wave function, and the positions of the other particles.
Concerning how one should think of the role of the wave function in
Bohm’s theory, John Bell once said that “no one can understand this theory
until he is willing to think of ψ as a real objective field rather than just
a ‘probability amplitude.’ Even though it propagates not in 3-space but in
3N-space” (1987, 128). While the ontology suggested by Bell here is at
best puzzling, the practical idea behind it is a good one: The best way to
picture what the particle dynamics does is to picture the point representing
the N -particle configuration being carried along by the probability currents
generated by the linear evolution of the wave function ψ in configuration
space. Once one has this picture firmly in mind one will understand how
Bohm’s theory accounts for quantum-mechanical correlations in the context
of the surreal-trajectory experiments and the sense in which the theory is
fundamentally incompatible with relativity.
Since the total particle configuration can be thought of as being pushed
around by the probability current in configuration space, the probability of
the particle configuration being found in a particular region of configura-
tion space changes as the integral of |ψ|2 over that region changes. More
specifically, the continuity equation
∂ρ
∂t
+ div(ρvψ) = 0 (3)
is satisfied by the probability density ρ = |ψ|2. And this means that if
the epistemic probability density for the particle configuration is ever |ψ|2,
then it will always be |ψ|2, unless one makes an observation. That is, if
4
one starts with an epistemic probability density of ρ(t0) = |ψ(t0)|2, then,
given the dynamics, one should update this probability density at time t so
that ρ(t) = |ψ(t)|2. And if one makes an observation, then the epistemic
probability density will be given by the system’s effective wave function,
the component (in the configuration space representation) of the total wave
function that is in fact responsible for the post-measurement time evolution
of the system’s configuration. The upshot is that if the distribution postulate
is ever satisfied, then the most that one can learn from a measurement is the
wave packet that the current particle configuration is associated with and
the epistemic probability distribution for the actual configuration over this
packet.3 This is why Bohm’s theory makes the same statistical predictions
for particle configurations as the standard collapse formulation of quantum
mechanics.
While it makes the same statistical predictions as the standard formu-
lation of quantum mechanics, Bohm’s theory is deterministic. More specif-
ically, given the energy properties of a simple closed system, the complete
physical state at any time (the wave function and the particle configuration)
fully determines the physical state at all other times.4. It follows that, given
a particular evolution of the wave function, possible trajectories for the con-
figuration of a system can never cross at a time in configuration space. And
this feature of Bohm’s theory will prove important later.
Another feature of Bohm’s theory that will prove imporant later is the
3See Du¨rr, D., S. Goldstein, and N. Zangh´i (1993) for a discussion of the equivariance
of the statistical distribution ρ and the notion of the effective wave function in Bohm’s
theory.
4We will say that a closed system is simple if the Hamiltonian is bounded and if the
particle configuration always has positive wave function support.
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special role played by position in accounting for our determinate measure-
ment results. In order for Bohm’s theory to explain why we get the determi-
nate measurement records that we do (which is presumably a precondition
for it counting as a solution to the measurement problem), one must sup-
pose, as a basic interpretational principle, that, given the usual quantum
mechanical state, making particle positions determinate provides determi-
nate measurement records. Since particle positions are always determinate
on Bohm’s theory, this would guarantee determinate measurement records.
And, at least on the minimal version of Bohm’s theory, position is the only
determinate, noncontextual property that could serve to provide determinate
measurement records.5
The distinction between noncontextual and contextual properties deserves
some explanation. Whether a system is found to have a particular contextual
property or not typically depends on how one measures the property: one
might get the result “Yes” if the contextual property is measured one way
and “No” if it is measured another. Consequently, contextual properties are
not intrinsic properties of the system to which they are typically ascribed.
One might say that contextual properties serve to prop up our talk of those
properties that we are used to talking about but which arguably should
not count as properties at all in Bohm’s theory. While the language of
contextual properties provides a convenient (but often misleading!) way of
comparing the predictions of Bohm’s theory with the predictions of other
physical theories, the predictions of Bohm’s theory are always ultmately just
predictions about the evolution of the wavefunction and the positions of the
particles relative to the wavefunction.
5There is a sense in which one might say that some dynamical properties, like mo-
mentum, are also noncontextual in Bohm’s theory, but, as we will see, the noncontextual
momentum is not the measured momentum.
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The upshot of all this is just that position relative to the wave function,
or more precisely configuration relative to the wave function, is ultimately
the only property that one can appeal to in the minimal version of Bohm’s
theory to explain how it is that we end up with the determinate measurement
records we do. And this means that for an interaction to count as a mea-
surement, it must produce a record in terms of the position of something—it
must correlate the position of something with some aspect of the quantum-
mechanical state of the system being measured. So in order to explain our
determinate measurement records on Bohm’s theory one must suppose that
all measurement records are ultimately position records, records represented
in the relationship between the particle configuration and the wave function.
And since Bohm’s theory predicts the right quantum statistics for particle
positions relative to the wave function, it predicts the right quantum statis-
tics for our measurement records.6
3
In their 1992 paper Englert, Scully, Su¨ssman, and Walther (ESSW) argued
that the trajectories predicted by Bohm’s theory are not the real trajectories
followed by particles, but rather are “surreal”. The worry is that the observed
trajectories of particles are not the trajectories that the particles actually
follow in Bohm’s theory. And if our observations are reliable and if Bohm’s
theory predicts the wrong particle trajectories, then this is presumably a
problem for the theory.
6The point here is that making the right statistical predictions concerning particle
configurations is not necessarily a sufficient condition for making the right statistical pre-
dictions for our measurement records. One needs to make an extra assumption about the
relationship between particle configurations and measurement records.
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ESSW describe the surreal trajectories problem in the context of a two-
path, delayed-choice interference experiment. John Bell (1980, reprinted in
1987) was perhaps the first to consider such an experiment in the context of
Bohm’s theory.
Consider an experiment where a spin-1/2 particle P starts at region S in
a z-spin up eigenstate, has its wave packet split into an x-spin up component
that travels from A to A′ and an x-spin down component that travels from
B to B′.7
[Figure 1: Crossing-Paths Experiment]
The wave function evolves as follows:
Initial state:
| ↑z〉P |S〉P = 1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P + | ↓x〉P )|S〉P (4)
After the initial wave packet splits:
1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A〉P + | ↓x〉P |B〉P ) (5)
Final state:
1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A′〉P + | ↓x〉P |B′〉P ) (6)
Bell explained that if one measures the properties of P in region I, then
one would observe interference phenomena (in this experiment, for example,
one would observe z-spin up with probability one). The observation of inter-
ference phenomena is usually taken to entail that P could not have followed
path A and could not have followed path B since, in either case, the probably
7Since the standard line is that position is the only observable physical quantity in
Bohm’s theory, this does not mean that P has a determinate z-spin; rather, it is just a
description of the spin index associated with P ’s effective wave function.
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of observing z-spin up in I would presumably be 1/2 (as predicted by the
standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics). In such a situation,
one would say, on the standard view, that P followed a superposition of the
two trajectories (which, on the standard interpretation of states is supposed
to be neither one nor the other nor both trajectories). But according to
Bohm’s theory, P determinately follows one or the other of the two trajec-
tories: that is, it either determinately follows A or it determinately follows
B. On Bohm’s theory, one might say that the interference effects that one
observes at I are the result of the wave function following both paths.
If we do not observe the particle in region I, then P will arrive at one
of the two detectors to the right of the interference region: either the one
at A′ or the one at B′. If it arrives at A′, then one might suppose that
the particle traveled path A; and if it arrives at B′, then one might suppose
that it traveled path B. But such inferences do not work in the standard
collapse formulation of quantum mechanics, where (according to the standard
eigenvalue-eigenstate link) under these circumstances P would have traveled
a superpostion of the two paths. And such inferences do not work in Bohm’s
theory either, but for a very different reason. In Bohm’s theory the particle
really does travel one or the other of the two paths, it is just that its trajectory
is not what one might at first expect.
In figuring out what trajectory Bohm’s theory predicts, the first thing to
note is that, by symmetry, the probability current across the line L is always
zero.8 This means that if P starts in the top half of the initial wave packet,
then it must move from S to A to I to B′; and if it starts in the bottom half
of the initial wave packet, then it must move from S to B to I to A′. That
8See Phillipidas, Dewdney, and Hiley (1979) for an explicit calculation of the trajec-
tories in for a similar experiment. The explicit calulations, of course, show that possible
particle trajectories never cross L. Bell cites this paper at the end of his 1980 paper on
delayed-choice experiments in Bohm’s theory.
9
is, whichever path P takes, Bohm’s theory predicts that it will bounce when
it gets to region I—in order to follow either trajectory, the particle P must
accelerate in the field-free region I.
Concerning this odd bouncing behavior Bell says that “it is vital here
to put away the classical prejudice that a particle moves in a straight path
in ‘field free’ space” (1987, 113). But certainly, one might object, this is
more than a prejudice. After all, this particle bouncing nonsense is a direct
violation of the conservation of momentum, and we have very good empirical
reasons for supposing that momentum is conserved. Isn’t this alone reason
enough to dismiss Bohm’s theory? Put another way, whenever we observe
which path the particle in fact travels, if we find it at A′, then we also
observed it traveling path A and if we find it at B′, then we also observed it
traveling path B. That is, whenever we make the appropriate observations,
we never observe the crazy bouncing behavior (or any of the other violations
of the conservation of momentum) predicted by Bohmian mechanics.
This puzzling situation is the basis for ESSW’s surreal trajectories argu-
ment. The argument goes something like this:
Assumption 1 (explicit): Our experimental measurement records tell us
that in a two-path interference experiment like that described above each
particle either travels from A to A′ or from B to B′; that is, they never
bounce.
Assumption 2 (implicit): Our measurement records reliably tell us where
a particle is at the moment the record is made.
Assumption 3 (implicit): One can record which path a particular parti-
cle takes without breaking the symmetry in the probability currents that
prevents the particle from crossing the line L.
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Conclusion: The trajectory predicted by Bohm’s theory, where the particle
bounces, cannot be the particle’s actual trajectory; that is, Bohm trajectories
are not real, they are “surreal.” And if the trajectories predicted by Bohm’s
theory are not the actual particle trajectories, then Bohm’s theory is false,
and this constitutes very good grounds for rejecting it.
Du¨rr, Fusseder, Goldstein, and Zanghi (DFGZ) immediately responded
to defend Bohm’s theory against the surreal trajectories argument:
In a recent paper [ESSW (1992)] it is argued that dispite its many
virtues—its clarity and simplicity, both conceptual and physical,
and the fact that it resolves the notorious conceptual difficulties
which plague orthodox quantum theory—BM [Bohmian mechan-
ics] itself suffers from a fatal flaw: the trajectories that it defines
are “surrealistic”. It must be admitted that this is an intriguing
claim, though an open minded advocate of quantum orthodoxy
would presumably have preferred the clearer and stronger claim
that BM is incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory,
so that, despite its virtues, it would not in fact provide an expla-
nation of quantum phenomena. The authors are, however, aware
that such a claim would be false. (1993, 1261)
And since Bohm’s theory makes the same predictions as the standard theory
of quantum mechanics, DFGZ argue that ESSW cannot possibly provide, as
ESSW describe it, “an experimentum crucis which, according to our quan-
tum theoretic prediction, will clearly demonstrate that the reality attributed
to Bohm trajectories is rather metaphysical than physical.” And with this
DFGZ dismiss ESSW’s argument against Bohmian mechanics:
On the principle that the suggestions of scientists who propose
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pointless experiments cannot be relied upon with absolute confi-
dence, with this proposal the [ESSW] paper self-destructs: The
authors readily agree that the “quantum theoretical predictions”
are also the predictions of BM. Thus they should recognize that
the [experimental] outcome on the basis of which they hope to
discredit BM is precisely the outcome predicted by BM. Under
the circumstances it would appear prudent for the funding agen-
cies to save their money! (1261)
DFGZ conclude their defense of Bohm’s theory by making a point about the
theory-ladenness of talk of particle trajectories and a point about the theory-
ladenness of observation itself. But we will return to these two (important)
points later, when we have the conceptual tools hand to make sense of them
(Section 5).
In their reply to DFGZ’s comment, ESSW want to make it perfectly clear
that they did not anywhere conceed that Bohm’s theory had “many virtues”
nor did they admit that the orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics was
“plagued by notorious conceptual difficulties.” But, for their part, ESSW do
seem to conceed, as DFGZ insisted, that Bohmiam mechanics makes the
same empirical predictions as standard quantum mechanics: “Nowhere did
we claim that BM makes predictions that differ from those of standard quan-
tum mechanics” (1263).9 Rather than argue that Bohm’s theory made the
9But ESSW later make the following argument in favor of actually funding the surreal
trajectories experiments that they describe: “Funding agencies were and are well advised
to support experiments that have probed or would probe the “surprises” of quantum
theory. Imagine the (farfetched) situation that the experimenter finds the photon always
in the resonator through which the Bohm trajectory passes rather than the one predicted
by quantum theory. Wouldn’t that please the advocates of BM?” (1263–4). This is, of
course, very puzzling talk indeed once EWWS conceed that Bohmian mechanics makes
the same empirical predictions as the standard theory—a proponent of Bohm’s theory
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wrong empirical predictions, ESSW claim that the purpose of their original
paper was “to show clearly that the interpretation of the Bohm trajectory—
as the real retrodicted history of the [test particle that travels through the
interferometer]—is implausible, because this trajectory can be macroscopi-
cally at variance with the detected, actual way though the interferometer”
(1263). This last clause identifies the detected path with the actual path
traveled by the test particle. This is their (implicit) assumption that par-
ticle detectors would be reliable (in a perfectly straightforward way) on the
delayed-choice interference experiments that they discuss. ESSW conclude,
“Irrespective of what can be said in addition, we think that we have done a
useful job in demonstrating just how artificial the Bohm trajectories can be”
(1264).
Again, ESSW’s claim is not that Bohm’s theory makes the wrong empir-
ical predictions nor it is that the theory is somehow logically inconsistent;
rather, they argue (on the implicit assumption that our particle detectors
reliably tell us where particles are) that Bohm’s theory makes the wrong
predictions for the actual motions of particles—that the predicted particle
trajectories are “artificial,” “metaphysical,” and, at best, “implausible.”
While I agree with DFGZ that surreal trajectories are not something
that a proponent of Bohm’s theory should worry about, the full story is a
bit more involved than the sketch given in their comment on ESSW’s paper.
In order to get everything straight, let’s return to Bell’s original analysis of
the delayed-choice interference experiment in the context of Bohm’s theory.
would most certainly not be pleased if experiments showed that the standard quantum-
mechanical predictions were false because this would mean that Bohm’s theory was itself
false! When ESSW say things like this, it is easy to understand DFGZ’s frustration.
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4Bell’s analysis of the delayed-choice interference experiment provides a good
first step in explaining why conservation-of-momentum-violating “surreal”
trajectories do not pose a problem for Bohm’s theory. While Bohm’s theory
does indeed predict that momentum (in the usual sense) is not conserved in
experiments like that described above, Bell explained why one would never
detect violations of the conservation of momentum. The short story is this:
while the actual momentum (mass times particle velocity) is typically not
conserved in Bohm’s theory, the measured momentum (as expressed by the
results of what one would ordinarily take to be momentum measurements)
is always conserved.
In order to detect a momentum-violating bounce in an experiment like
that described above, one would have to perform two measurements: one to
show which path the particle travels, (A or B) and another to show where the
particle ends up (A′ or B′). One might then try to show that a particle that
travels path A, say, ends up at B′, and thus violates the conservation of mo-
mentum. But one will never observe such a bounce in Bohm’s theory because
measuring which path the particle follows will destroy the symmetry in the
probability currents that generate the bounce. That is, particles only exhibit
their crazy bouncing behavior in Bohm’s theory when no one is looking!
Suppose (following Bell 1980) that one puts a detector on path B designed
to correlate the position of a flag with the position of the test particle P (see
figure 2). More specifically, consider a single flag particle F whose position
(as represented by the quantum-mechanical state) gets correlated with the
position of P as follows: (1) if P is in an eigenstate of traveling path A,
then F remains in an eigenstate of pointing at “No” and (2) if P is in an
eigenstate of traveling path B, then F ends up in an eigenstate of pointing at
“Yes”. That is, the detector is designed so that the position of F will record
14
the path taken by P .
[Figure 2: Experiment where F ’s position is correlated with the position
of P ]
While this experiment may look like the earlier one, introducing such a
detector requires one to tell a very different story than the one told without
the detector.
Given the nature of the interaction between P and F and the linearity of
the dynamics, if P begins in the z-spin up state (a superposition of x-spin
eigenstates), then the effective wave function of the composite system would
evolve as follows:
Initial state:
| ↑z〉P |S〉P |“No”〉F = |S〉P |“No”〉F1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P + | ↓x〉P ) (7)
P ’s wave packet splits:
|“No”〉F1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A〉P + | ↓x〉P |B〉P ) (8)
M ’s position is correlated with the position of P :
1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A〉P |“No”〉F + | ↓x〉P |B〉P |“Yes”〉F ) (9)
The two wave packets appear to pass though each other in region I (but they
miss each other in configuration space!):
1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |I〉P |“No”〉F + | ↓x〉P |I〉P |“Yes”〉F ) (10)
Final state:
1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A′〉P |“No”〉F + | ↓x〉P |B′〉P |“Yes”〉F ) (11)
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Note that the position of F does in fact reliably record where P was when
the position record was made. Because the wave function associated with
the two possible positions for F do not overlap in configuration space, the
position correlation between P and F destroys the symmetry that prevents
P from crossing L. While the two wave packets both appear to pass through
region I at the same time, they in fact miss each other in configuration
space. In order to see how P and F move, consider the evolution of the wave
function and the two-particle configuration in configuration space.
[Figure 3: The Last Experiment in Configuration Space]
If the two-particle configuration starts in the top half of the initial wave
packet (as represented in Figure 3), then P would move from S to A to I to
A′ and F would stay at “No”. If the configuration starts in the bottom half
of the initial wave packet, then P would move from S to B then F would
move to “Yes” then P would move from B to I to B′. That is, regardless of
where P starts, it will pass though the region I without bouncing. Moreover,
F will record that P was on path A if and only if P ends up at A′ and that
P was on path B if and only if P ends up at B′. That is, if one makes a
determinate record of P ’s position before P gets to I, then P will follow a
perfectly natural trajectory, and the record will be reliable. Again, recording
the position of P destroys the symmetry that prevents P from crossing L.
This experiment illustrates why a measurement record is reliable in Bohm’s
theory whenever there is a strong correlation between the position of the sys-
tem being observed and the position of the recording system. And since all
measurements are ultimately position measurements on the minimal Bohm’s
theory, one might simply conclude that all determinate records produced by
strong correlations are reliable in Bohm’s theory and dismiss the surreal-
trajectories problem as a problem that was solved by Bell before it was even
16
posed by ESSW. This is not such a bad conclusion, but the right thing to
say about surreal trajectories is slightly more subtle.
Note that in order to tell a story like the one above, one must record the
path taken by the test particle in terms of the position of something. Here
the record is in terms of the position of the flag particle F . It is this position
correlation that breaks the symmetry in the probability currents, which then
allows the test particle P to follow a momentum-conserving trajectory. All
it takes is a strong position correlation with even a single particle. And it is
this that makes the final position record reliable.10
So what would happen if one tried to record the position of P in terms of
some physical property other than position? This is something that is impor-
tant to our making sense of the history of the surreal trajectories problem,
but it is something that Bell did not consider.
10Bell explained that a good measurement record must make a macroscopic difference.
He emphasized that a discharged detector is macroscopically different from an undis-
charged detector. This is also something emphasized by DFGZ (1993, 1262) in order to
argue that one would not expect one of ESSW’s detectors to generate a sensible record
of which path the test particle followed ”until an interaction with a suitable macroscopic
device occurs.” But note that all that really matters here is that the wave packets that
correspond to different measurement outcomes (in terms of the position of F ) be well-
separated in configuration space in the F -position-record direction. This is not to say
that Bell’s (and DFGZ’s) point concerning macroscopic differences irrelevant. If the flag
is a macroscopic system that makes a macroscopic movement, then this will obviously
help to provide the wave packet separation required for a reliable record. But while a
macroscopic position correlation with a macroscopic system sufficient, it is not a neces-
sary condition for generating a reliable record in Bohm’s theory. See Aharonov, Y. and L.
Vaidman (1996) for a discussion of partial measurements in Bohm’s theory, measurements
where the separation between the post-measurement wave packets in configuration space
is incomplete.
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5In order to avoid Bell’s (preemptive) dissolution of the surreal trajectories
problem ESSW must have had in mind a different sort of which-path detector
than the one considered by Bell. Indeed, the experiments that ESSW describe
in their 1992 paper employ detectors that record the path followed by the
test particle in the creation of photons. A proponent of Bohm’s theory might
point out that since the theory is explicitly nonrelativistic and since the very
statement of its auxillary dynamics requires there to be a fixed number of
particles, these experiments are simply outside the domain of the theory. But
perhaps it is possible to capture at least the spirit of ESSW’s experiments
with experiments that are well within the domain of the minimal Bohm’s
theory.11
Consider what happens when one tries to record P ’s position in something
other than position (one might naturally, and quite correctly, object that
there is no other quantity in Bohm’s theory that one could use to record P ’s
position, but with the aim of trying to revive the surreal trajectories problem,
read on). Suppose, for example, that one tries to record P ’s position in a
particle M ’s x-spin: that is, suppose that the interaction between P and M
is such that if P ’s initial effective wave function were an x-spin up eigenstate,
then nothing would happen to M ’s effective wave function; but if P ’s initial
effective wave function were an x-spin down eigenstate, then the spin index of
M ’s effective wave function would be flipped from x-spin up to x-spin down
(since x-spin is a contextual property in the minimal Bohm’s theory, the value
of the x-spin record depends, as we will see, on how it is read, and one might
11The experiment below shows what would happen if one tried to record the path taken
by the particle in the x-spin of another particle. Dewdney, Hardy, and Squires (1993)
tried to capture the spirit of ESSW’s experiments by showing in graphic detail what
would happen if one tried to record the path in terms of energy.
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thus, quite correctly, argue that it is not a record of the position of P at all,
but read on). In the standard von Neumann-Dirac collapse formulation of
quantum mechanics (once a collapse had eliminated one term or the other of
the correlated superposition!) one might naturally think of this interaction
as recording P ’s position in M ’s x-spin. On this view, M might be thought
of as a sort of which-path detector.
Continuing with the experimental set up, suppose further that M ’s x-
spin might then be converted to a position record by a detector with a flag
particle F designed to point at “No” if M is in the x-spin up state and to
point at “Yes” ifM is in the x-spin down state. The conversion of the x-spin
record (though it will turn out that there is no determinate M-record until
after this conversion is made in the delay-choice interference experiments!)
to a position record here consists in correlating the position of F with the
x-spin of M (as represented by the quantum-mechanical state). The idea is
that if P is in an eigenstate of traveling path B, say, then M will record this
fact by the x-spin index on its wave function being flipped to x-spin down,
which is something that might then be converted into a record in terms of
the position of F through the interaction between M and F . In this case, F
would move to record the measurement result “Yes”.
[Figure 4: One tries to record the position of P in the x-spin of M ]
The effective wave function of the composite system then evolves as fol-
lows:
Initial state:
| ↑z〉P |S〉P | ↑x〉M |“No”〉F = |S〉P | ↑x〉M |“No”〉F1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P + | ↓x〉P ) (12)
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P wave packet is split:
| ↑x〉M |“No”〉F1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A〉P + | ↓x〉P |B〉P ) (13)
The x-spin component of M ’s wave packet is correlated to the position of
P ’s:
|“No”〉F1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A〉P | ↑x〉M + | ↓x〉P |B〉P | ↓x〉M) (14)
The two wave packets pass through each other in configuration space:
|“No”〉F1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |I〉P | ↑x〉M + | ↓x〉P |I〉P | ↓x〉M) (15)
Then they separate:
|“No”〉F1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A′〉P | ↑x〉M + | ↓x〉P |B′〉P | ↓x〉M) (16)
Then the position of the F is correlated to the x-spin component ofM ’s wave
packet:
1/
√
2(| ↑x〉P |A′〉P | ↑x〉M |“No”〉F + | ↓x〉P |B′〉P | ↓x〉M |“Yes”〉F ) (17)
Note that here the symmetry in the probability current that prevents P
from crossing L is preserved. That is, P bounces just as it did in the first
experiment we considered.
[Figure 5: Last experiment in configuration space]
If the three-particle configuration begins in the top half of the initial wave
packet (as represented in Figure 5), then P will move from S to A to I to
B′ then, when M and F interact, F will move to “Yes”. If the three-particle
configuration begins in the bottom half of the initial wave packet, then P
will move from S to B to I to A′ and, when M and F interact, F will stay at
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“No”. That is, the final position of the F will be at “No” if P traveled along
the lower path and it will be at “Yes” if P traveled along the upper path. In
other words, F ’s final position does not tell us which path P followed in the
way that it was intended.
One might naturally conclude that the which-path detector is fooled by
the late measurement, and defend Bohm’s theory against ESSW by deny-
ing their implicit assumption that the which-path detectors are reliable.12
There is, however, another way of looking at a delayed-choice interference
experiment where one tries to record the path in some property other than
position. One might claim both that Bohm’s theory is true and that one’s
detectors are perfectly reliable. This, it seems to me, is an option suggested
by DFGZ’s discussion of the theory-ladenness of talk of trajectories and of
observation itself near the end of their response to ESSW’s original paper.
Given their contention that the experiments described by ESSW could
provide no empirical reason for rejecting Bohmian mechanics, DFGZ ask the
question “So what on earth is going on here?”
The answer appears to be this: The authors [ESSW] distinguish
between the Bohm trajectory for the atom and the detected path
of the atom. In this regard it would be well to bear in mind
that before one can speak coherently about the path of a parti-
cle, detected or otherwise, one must have in mind a theoretical
framework in terms of which this notion has some meaning. BM
provides one such framework, but it should be clear that within
this framework the [test particle] can be detected passing only
through the slit through which its trajectory in fact passes. More
to the point, within a Bohmian framework it is the very existence
of trajectories wich allows us to assign some meaning to this talk
12In their 1993 paper, Dewdney, Hardy, and Squires argue precisely this.
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about detection of paths. (1261–2)
It seems that there are two points here. The first point concerns the theory-
ladenness of talk about trajectories. On the orthodox formulation of quantum
mechanics, there is no matter of fact at all concerning which path the test
particle traveled since it simply fails to have any determinate position what-
soever before it is detected. Indeed, insofar as ESSW’s description of the
surreal trajectories experments presupposes that there are determinate par-
ticle trajectories, they are presupposing something that is incompatible with
the very quantum orthodoxy they seek to defend! The point here is that any
talk of determinate trajectories is talk within a theory. A precondition of
such talk is that one have a theory where there are determinate trajectories,
a theory like Bohmian mechanics.
DFGZ’s second point, if I understand it correctly, concerns the theory-
ladenness of observation, but this will first require some clarification. Their
claim that in Bohmian mechanics a test particle “can be detected passing
only through the slit through which its trajectory in fact passes” suggests
that they were considering only experiments like those in the last section
where the which-path detector indicates in a perfectly straighforward way
the path that the test particle in fact followed. But DFGZ do in fact grant
that there are situations where Bohm’s theory predicts that a late observa-
tion of a which-path detector would find that the detector registers that the
test particle traveled one path when it in fact traveled the other. They also
grant that this is somewhat surprising. But they explain that “if we have
learned anything by now about quantum theory, we should have learned to
expect surprises!” And DFGZ maintain that even in such experiments the
measurement performed by the which-path detector “can indeed be regarded
as a measurement of which path the [test particle] has taken, but one that
22
conveys information which contradicts what naively would have been ex-
pected.” DFGZ then draw the moral that “BM, together with the authors
[ESSW] of the paper on which we are commenting, does us the service of
making it dramatically clear how very dependent upon theory is any talk of
measurement or observation” (1262).
While it is not entirely clear what DFGZ have in mind, one way to read
this is that, contrary to what is later argued by Dewdney, Hardy, and Squires
(1993), DFGZ take the which-path detector to be perfectly reliable even
in experiments where it “records” that the test particle traveled one path
when it in fact (according to Bohm’s theory) traveled the other once one
understands what the detector is detecting. On this reading, then, the point
here is that since observation is itself a theory-laden notion, what one is
detecting can only be determined in the context of a theory that explains
what it is that one is detecting. But if this is what DFGZ had in mind,
then what exactly does Bohm’s theory tell us that a which-path detector is
detecting in the context of a late-measurement experiment? (And is it really
possible to tell a plausible story where the detectors are perfectly reliable
here?)
Perhaps the easiest answer would be to insist that when one tries to record
the path taken by the test particle in a property other than position (in a
delayed-choice interference experiment), one’s which-path detector simply
works in exactly the opposite way that one would expect. The detector
is perfectly reliable—it is just that when it records that the test particle
traveled path A, the detector record (under such circumstances) reallymeans,
according to Bohm’s theory, that the test particle in fact traveled path B;
and, similarly, on this view a B record means, according to Bohm’s theory,
that the test particle traveled path A.
It seems, however, that this cannot be quite right. When one tries to
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record the path that the test particle traveled in a property other than posi-
tion (in the delayed-choice interference experiment), there is no determinate
record whatsoever (on the minimal Bohm’s theory) before the test particle
passes through the interference region I because the which-path detector
has not yet correlated the position of anything with the position of the test
particle.
The right thing to say, it seems to me, is that while the which-path de-
tector does not detect anything before one correlates the position of the flag
F with M ’s x-spin (on the minimal Bohm’s theory), whenever one makes a
determinate record in Bohm’s theory using a device that induces a strong cor-
relation between the measured position of the object system and the position
that records the outcome, then that record will be perfectly reliable at the
moment the determinate record is made. On this view, there is still a sense
in which one can think of the detectors in the delayed-choice interference
experiments as being perfectly reliable, but this will take some explaining.
As DFGZ suggest, we naturally rely on our best physical theories to
tell us what it is that our measuring devices in fact measure, so what does
Bohm’s theory tell us about the late-measurement of the which-path detector
in the delayed-choice interference experiment? Note, again, that there is no
determinate record whatsoever before the late measurement. Also note that
while the final position of F does not tell us where P was when P interacted
with M , it does reliably tell us where P is at the moment that the x-spin
correlation is converted into a determinate measurement record (when the
position of F is correlated with the x-spin of M): if one gets the result “No”
(x-spin up), then the theory tells us that P is currently associated with the
x-spin up wave packet wherever that wave packet may be, and if one gets the
result “Yes” (x-spin down), then it tells us that P is currently associated
with the x-spin down wave packet wherever that wave packet may be.
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So this is how it works. Since the only determinate noncontextual records
in Bohm’s theory are records in terms of the position of something, there is,
stictly speaking, no determinate record of P ’s position until we convert the
correlation between the position of P and the x-spin of M into a correlation
between the position of P and the position of F . And whenever this position
correlation is made, we reliably, and nonlocally, generate a record of P ’s
position at that moment . If we wait until after P has passed through region
I, then if F stays at “No”, this means that P is associated with the x-
spin up component which means that it is at position A′, and if F moves
to “Yes”, this means that P is associated with the x-spin down component
which means that it is at position B′. The moral is that one cannot use a
record in Bohm’s theory to figure out which path P took unless one knows
how and when the record was made.
But note that in this Bohm’s theory is arguably better off than the stan-
dard von Neumann-Dirac collapse formulation of quantum mechanics. On
the standard eigenvalue-eigenstate link (where a system determinately has a
property if and only if it is in an eigehstate of having the property) one can
say nothing whatsoever about which trajectory a particle followed since it
would typically fail to have any determinate position until it was observed.
If one does not worry about the unreliability of retrodiction in the context
of the standard collapse theory (and ESSW do not seem to be worried about
this!), then I can see no reason at all to worry about it in the context of
Bohm’s theory. Further, there is no reason to suppose that Bohmian particle
trajectories are not the actual particle trajectories. Nor is there any reason
to conclude that our good particle detectors are somehow unreliable. Rather
than saying that a detector is fooled by a late measurement, one should, I
suggest, say that the late measurement reliably detects the position of the
test particle nonlocally.
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On this view the surreal trajectories experiments simply serve to reveal
the special role played by position and, ultimately, the nonlocal structure
of Bohm’s theory. As Bell explained, “The fact that the guiding wave, in
the general case, propagates not in ordinary three space, but in a multi-
dimentional configuration space in the origin of the notorious ‘nonlocality’
of quantum mechanics. It is a merit of the de Broglie-Bohm version to bring
this out so explicity that it cannot be ignored” (1987, 115). But one should
note that it is not some subtle sort of nonlocality involved in the account
of quantum-mechanical correlations here. The configuration space particle
dynamics that accounts for the nonlocal correlations in the late-measurement
experiments makes Bohm’s theory incompatible with relativity.
But there is one more point that I would like to make before turning to a
discussion of the relationship between how Bohm’s theory accounts for surreal
trajectories and its incompatibility with relativity. As suggested above (on
the minimal Bohm’s theory) whenever the position of one system is recorded
in the position of another system via a strong correlation between the effec-
tive wave functions of the two systems (one that produces the appropriate
separation of the wave function in the recording parameter in configuration
space), then that record will reliably indicate where the measured particle
is at the moment the determinate record is made. It is also the case (on the
minimal Bohm theory) that all determinate records are ultimately position
records. One can only take these facts to provide a solution to the surreal
trajectories if one allows for Bohm’s theory to tell one something about what
one is observing when one observes (or, in somewhat different language, what
constitues a good measuring device). But it seems that this is precisely the
sort of thing that one must be willing to do when entertaining a new theoret-
ical option. One might dogmatically insist on holding to one’s pre-theoretic
intuitions concerning what one’s detectors detect come what may, but this
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would certainly be a methodological mistake.
6
Consider again the late-measurement experiment of the last section (see fig-
ures 4 and 5). If P begins in the top half of the wave function at S, it will
travel path A to I in the x-spin up wave packet. That is, before P gets
to I, the three-particle configuration will be associated with the x-spin up
component of the wave function in configuration space. And this means that
if one converts the spin record into a position record before the two wave
packets interfer at I, one will get the result “No”. But if P continues to I,
bounces, and the two-particle configuration is picked up by the x-spin down
wave packet, then, since the two-particle configuration is now associated with
the x-spin down wave packet, if one now converts the x-spin record into a
position record, one will get the result “Yes” .
This means that one might instantaneously determine the value of the
converted record at B (the record one gets by converting the M x-spin
“record” into an F position record) by choosing whether or not to inter-
fer the two wave packets at I. If the two wave packets pass through each
other, then F will move to “Yes” when the spin record is converted; if not,
then F will stay at “No” when the spin record is converted. So, if someone
at I knew which path P was on (something, as explained earlier, that is
prohibited in Bohm’s theory if the distribution postulate is satisfied), then
he or she could use this information to send a superluminal signal to a friend
on path B by deciding whether or not to interfere the wave packets at I.
But regardless of whether one knows which path P is on, the theory predicts
(insofar as one is comfortable with the relavant counterfactuals in the context
of a deterministic theory) that one can instantaneously affect the result of
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a measurement of M from region I, and one might take the possibility of
superluminal effects here to illustrate the incompatibility of Bohm’s theory
and relativity.
This incompatibility is more clearly illustrated by considering the role
that the temporal order of events plays in Bohm’s theory. Consider the late-
measurement experiment one more time. If one converts the spin record
before the two wave packets interfer at I, then one will get the result “No”;
and if one converts the spin record after the wave packets interfer, then one
will get the result “Yes”. But if the conversion of the spin record and the
interference of the wave packets are space-like separated events, then the
conversion event occurs before the interference event in some inertial frames
and after the interference event in others. So in order to get any empirical
predictions whatsoever out of Bohm’s theory for this experiment whenever
the conversion and interference events are space-like separated, one must
choose a perfered inertial frame that imposes a perfered temporal order on
the conversion and interference events. But having to choose a perfered
intertial frame here is a direct violation of the basic principles of relativity.
This is the sense in which the account that Bohm’s theory provides of the
late-measurement experiment is fundamentally incompatible with relativity.
If the distribution postulate is satisfied, then Bohm’s theory makes the
same empirical predictions as the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation
of quantum mechanics (whenever the latter makes unambiguous predictions)
and the standard quantum statistics do not allow one to send superluminal
messages (given the usual quantum statistics, one can prove a no-signaling
theorem). So while Bohm’s theory is not Lorentz-covariant, it explains why
one would never notice this fact (just as it explains why one would never
notice violations in the conservation of momentum).
A proponent of Bohm’s theory might argue that nonlocally correlated
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motions like the correlated motions in the conversion and interference events
describe above is too weak of a relationship to be causal, and that Bohm’s
theory thus does not in fact allow for nonlocal causation. While such a con-
clusion would do nothing to make Bohm’s theory compatible with relativity
even if it were granted, I do not think that it should be granted. It seems
to me that if any correlated motions should count as causally connected in
Bohm’s theory, then nonlocal correlated motions should as well. Nonlocal
correlated motions, like local correlated motions (insofar as their are any
truly local correlated motions!), are simply the result of the configuration
space evolution of the physical state. The point here is that Bohm’s theory
handles nonlocal correlated motions precisely the same way that it handles
events that one would presumably want to count as causal—like the cor-
related motion produced between a football and the foot that kicks it. Of
course, one might resist the conclusion that nonlocal correlated motions are
causally related by denying that there are any causal relationships whatso-
ever in Bohm’s theory. But this would mean that even those explanations
that one gives that look like causal explanations are not, and this seems to
me to be putting things the wrong way around. Just as we look to our best
theories to tell us how to build good detectors and to explain what it is that
they detect, it seems that we should also look to our best theories to tell us
something about the nature of causal relations. There is nothing inherently
wrong with sitting down and deciding once and for all the necessary and
sufficient conditions for events to be causally related. It is just that one risks
adopting a notion of causation that is irrelavant to the sort of explanations
provided by our best physical theories.13
13Michael Dickson (1996) has argued that it does not make any sense to ask whether
a deterministic theory like Bohm’s theory is local because of the difficulty supporting
counterfactual conditionals in such a theory. He also suggests that the notion of causality
may not make make sense in such a theory either (1996, 329). I agree that some intuitions
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But regardless of what one thinks about causality, the particle trajectories
predicted by Bohm’s theory depend on one’s choice of inertial frame, which
means that the theory is incompatible with the basic principles of relativity.
And this is the real problem.
7
It is the configuration space dynamics that makes Bohm’s theory incom-
patible with relativity. But it is also the instantaneous correlated motion
predicted by the configuration space dynamics that explains the quantum-
mechanical correlations in Bohm’s theory and makes the theory empirically
adequate. And it is the configuration space dynamics that allows one to say
that whenever the position of one system is recorded in the position of an-
other system via a strong correlation between the effective wave functions of
the two systems, then that record will reliably indicate where the measured
system is at the moment the determinate record is made, which, it seems
to me, is ultimately the best response to the supposed surreal trajectory
problem.
But this leaves a proponent of Bohm’s theory with a difficult choice.
One might try to find some new way to account for quantum-mechanical
correlations, one that does not require a preferred temporal order for space-
like separated events where objects exhibit correlated properties. But it
should be clear from the the configuration-space stories told above that such
a theory would have to explain quantum-mechanical correlations in a way
concerning what it would mean for a theory to be local or what it would mean for one
event to cause another cannot be supported in a deterministic theory, but this does not
mean that we can make no sense at all of what it would be for a deterministic theory
to be local or for one event to cause another. Indeed, whether Bohm’s theory is Lorentz
covariant is a perfectly good sensible question concerning its locality—and it isn’t.
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that is fundamentally different from the configuration-space way in which
they are explained by Bohm’s theory. And, of course, actually finding such
an alternative is much easier said than done.14 Or one might simply drop
the requirement of Lorentz covariance as a feature of a satisfactory dynamics
and settle for something weaker, perhaps something like appearant Lorentz
covariance. But this would be an enormous theoretical sacrifice—presumably
one that few physicists would seriously entertain.
14For other discussions of the incompatibility of Bohm’s theory and relativity see Albert
(1992) and Artnzenius (1994). For a recent discussion concerning the difficulty in getting
a Bohm-like auxiliary quantum dynamics that is compatible with relativity see Dickson
and Clifton (1998).
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